Law Note

COASTAL ZONE MANAGEMENT-THE TIDELANDS:
LEGISLATIVE APATHY vs. JUDICIAL CONCERN
Except for combatting pollution of its air and water, California
has no more important environmental challenge than controlling
haphazard development of its shoreline.'
INTRODUCTION
The following three cases, City of Long Beach v. Mansell,2
Candlestick Properties,Inc. v. San FranciscoBay Conservation and
Development Commission,3 and Zabel v. Tabb,4 are important recent
developments in the rapidly expanding area of the law of coastal
zone management. The purpose of this article is to present each of
the cases individually, then to demonstrate how the inter-relation
of the three cases can and probably will be utilized by the courts to
effectuate legislative policy.
Generally, tidelands comprise that land which is covered and uncovered by the rise and fall of ordinary tides and which is the ecologically important interface between the ocean and the continental
land mass. Commonly included in tidelands are estuaries 5 and tidal
1. Editorial, Los Angeles Times, Dec. 10, 1970, Part II at 6, col. 1.
2. 3 Cal. 3d 462, 91 Cal. Rptr. 23, 476 P.2d 423 (1970).
3. 11 Cal. App. 3d 557, 89 Cal. Rptr. 897 (1970).

4. 430 F.2d 199 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 39 U.S.L.W. 3360 (U.S.
Feb. 22, 1971).

5. That part of the lower course of a bay or river flowing into the
sea which is subject to tide.
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marshes.0 The importance of this narrow strip surrounding the
continent is partially demonstrated when it is realized that approximately two-thirds of all coastal sport fish are dependent on the
tidelands during part of their lives, 7 that this nation's seven largest
metropolitan areas are located on or near large bodies of water subject to tidal influence,8 and that everyone enjoys "going to the
beach for a picnic."9
The problems of tidelands management have largely been creaated by piecemeal regulatory measures designed to meet specific
problems and situations without adequate consideration of the total
water-atmosphere-soils-mineral ecological continuum commonly
called the environment. 10 Multiplicity of agencies exercising control in the coastal zone at all levels of government, lack of coordination and planning in the marine resource area, and the total neglect of the tidelands by governmental officials are well documented 1 and amply demonstrated by Candlestick, Long Beach,
and Zabel. None-the-less, a consideration of the ecosystem of the
coastal zone is beyond the scope of this article; instead the focus will
be on the California effort to administer and manage the tidelands,
emphasing legal issues arising out of man-made physical altera6. See, 1 A. SHALow z, SHoRE Am SEA BoUmDARs, (Coast and Geodetic
Survey Pub. No. 10-1, 1964), for a definitive analysis of the ocean-continental landmass interaction; see also Comment, Fluctuating Shorelines and
Tidal Boundaries,6 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 447 (1969).
7. Hearings on Estuarine Areas before the Subcomm. on Fisheries and
Wildlife Conservation of the House Comm. on Merchant Marine and Fisheries, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., 29 (1967).
8. Our Nation And The Sea-A Planfor National Action, H.R. Doc. No.
91-42, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., at 52 (1969).
9. Additionally, the following beneficial, and often competing, uses for
the tidelands are often cited:
a. population growth and urbanization;
b. conservation and utilization of mineral and living resources;
c. esthetics;
d. waste disposal and dispersion into the ocean;
e. water and power development;
f. engineering and technological research and development of the ocean
resources;
g. commerce in the coastal zone.
10. DERNING = CALIFORNIA PUBLIC INTEEST nT COASTAL ZONE MANAGEATEnT, 2ND Am. REP. OF THE CAuIFORNIA ADvisoRY Comvnmq. ON MARINE AND
COASTAL RESOURCES (1970) [hereinafter cited as 2ND CMC REP.]; Hearings

on S.2752 Before the Subcomm. on IntergovernmentalRelations of the Senate Comm. on Gov't Operations, 91st Cong., 2nd Sess., pt. 1, at 67 (1970)
[hereinafter cited as S 2752 Hearings]; Power, Chesapeake Bay in Legal
Perspective, 129 et seq. (1970); 3 MAINE LAw AFFEcTING MARNE REsouRcEs,
University of Maine School of Law (1970) [hereinafter cited as MAINE
LAw].
11. See, e.g., authorities cited note 8, supra.
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tions which tend to diminish the physical area of the tidelands. 12
Although it has been suggested that the states are inadequate
vehicles for managing the coastal zone,' 3 California generally does
not suffer from the geographical/jurisdictional inter-state conflicts
surrounding the exploitation of the tidelands that have hampered
the use of management techniques on the eastern seaboard.' 4 Thus
the California experience, if ultimately successful, may provide the
basic model upon which the federal and state governments may
base their programs for the development and conservation of their
tidelands.
Long Beach, Zabel, and Candlestick demonstrate the conflicts
which can arise when five different entities (federal, state, regional,
municipal and private land owner), exercise some degree of control
in the coastal zone. A careful consideration of these cases will show
the role that may be played by our legal system in effectuating
policy decisions at all five levels of control.
CITY OF LONG BEACH v. MANSELL' 5
In 1965 the California legislature enacted legislation disclaiming
state and other public interest in certain coastal zone lands in the
Alamitos Bay area of the City of Long Beach and authorizing conveyance of these lands.' 6 The land has been highly developed by
both private parties and public agencies and comprises at least 40
acres today worth over $19 million.' 7 Among other uses, the area
is one of the most attractive marina-complexes in the state.
12. It should be noted that no planning or developmental effort for the
coastal zone can be wholly effective in maximizing beneficial uses while
minimizing deleterious uses without a consideration of:
a. the entire coastal zone (which includes the area between the coastal
watershed out to the three mile limit);
b. all the various competing interests and effects;
c. centralize planning and enforcement. 2ND CMC REP. supra note 10,
at 9.
13. See Knight, Proposed Systems of Coastal Zones Management, 3
NAT. RES. LAW. 599

(1970).

14. E.g., Power, supra note 10, at 224.
15. 3 Cal. 3d 462, 476 P.2d 423, 91 Cal. Rptr. 23 (1970) [hereinafter cited
as Long Beach].
16. Cal. Stat. §§ 1-9, ch. 1688 (1965).
17. Brief for Respondents at 41, 43, City of Long Beach v. Mansell, 3
Cal. 3d 462, 476 P.2d 423, 91 Cal. Rptr. 23 (1970).

A combination of factors cast a cloud on the title to the land, and
the parties agreed that an action to quiet title would have been of no
practical value.' 8 Pursuant to the legislation, two agreements, between the city and state on the one hand and private parties to this
action on the other, were completed. The city manager and city
clerk of Long Beach refused to perform the ministerial duties necessary to complete these agreements on the grounds that the legislation violated constitutional and common law prohibitions against
the alienation of state-owned tidelands and submerged lands.
The City of Long Beach, invoking the California Supreme Court's
original jurisdiction,'9 sought a pre-emptory writ of mandate commanding its city manager and clerk to execute the agreements.
Several real parties in interest joined the action. 20 Held: Writ
issued because the agreements did not violate the California Constitution or were enforceable under the doctrine of equitable estoppel. City of Long Beach v. Mansell, 3 Cal. 3d 462, 476 P.2d 423, 91
Cal. Rptr. 23 (1970).
UncertainState of Title in the Area
The following is a summary of the voluminous stipulated facts
and shows how the confusion and uncertainty as to the ownership
of the coastal zone lands arose.
In 1784, Rancho Los Alamitos, which included the area in question, was created by a grant of the Spanish governor. A United
States Government survey of the area, approved in 1874, simplified
the boundaries of the grant by showing straight meander lines and
reducing the number of courses around the bay, thereby excluding
certain portions of the grant above the high water mark. To complicate matters further, the mouth of Alamitos Bay moved southward over the years, and1 it was impossible to separate the accretive
from avulsive changes.

2

18. 3 Cal. 3d at 467, 476 P.2d at 427, 91 Cal. Rptr. at 27.
19. CAL. CoxsT. art. VI, § 10.
20. Real parties in interest are: (1) the State of California; (2) the Los
Angeles County Flood Control District; (3) the Title Insurance Corporation;
(4) Security Pacific National Bank, as trustee of a trust holding substantial
private lands in the area; and (5) Macco Realty Co., holding a surface lease
on the lands held in the aforementioned trust. 3 Cal. 3d at 468 n.3, 476 P.2d
at 427 n.3, 91 Cal. Rptr. at 27 n.3.
21. The augmentation of existing upland by gradual natural accretion
alters the boundary of that upland accordingly. When such augmentation
occurs as a result of a sudden avulsion or by accretion caused by the works
of man, however, the boundary is not altered. 3 Cal. 3d at 469 n.4, 476
P.2d at 428 n.4, 91 Cal. Rptr. at 28 n.4.
Delineating accretive and avulsive changes in the shoreline is, in itself,
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In 1903, a tract map was filed, despite the uncertainty as to the
boundaries in the grant, that included a portion of land not within
the original Spanish grant. Much of the land in question was privately improved in accordance with the 1903 tract map. There
was no agreement at the time of suit among the parties as to the
original or present boundaries of the grant and the present boun22
daries of parcels whose title derived from it.
In 1886, a successor in interest to the original grant received state
patents on 900 acres of tidelands within the bay. The patents were
valid and served to pass title to the land,23 but their original and
present boundaries were uncertain mainly because there was no attempt at a comprehensive survey until 1966, when the monuments
and other lines intended in the original patents could not be determined.24 Again, substantial private and public development took
place on these now reclaimed lands, and uncertainty as to the true
boundaries rendered the titles in doubt.
Natural factors also contributed to the confusion. The most significant factor in the change of the configuration of the bay area
was the San Gabriel River. The changes it wrought were both accretive and avulsive. The most dramatic of the avulsive type was a
flood in 1867-68 that cut a new channel and emptied the river
through the Alamitos Bay. There has been constant dredging and
filling of the area, all with the consent of the United States Army
Corps of Engineers.25 At the present it is impossible to determine
which of the physical changes are accretive or avulsive, nor is it
possible, with respect to certain filled areas, to determine whether
they were artificially or naturally filled. The resulting title and
26
boundary problems were therefore not soluble.
a most difficult problem. See Comment, Fluctuating Shorelines and Tidal
Boundaries: An Unresolved Problem, 6 SAN DIEGo L. REV. 447 (1969).
22. 3 Cal. 3d at 469, 476 P.2d at 428, 91 Cal. Rptr. at 28.
23. The California constitutional provision, article XV section 3, which
forbids the alienation of tidelands within two miles of an incorporated
city, was in effect in 1886, but the tidelands in question were then more
than two miles from an incorporated city. Section 7991 of the CAL. PUB.
RES. CODE (West 1956), which presently forbids the sale of tidelands, was
not enacted until 1909. Id. at 469 n.5, 476 P.2d at 428 n.5, 11 Cal. Rptr. at
28 n.5.
24. 3 Cal. 3d at 469, 476 P.2d at 428, 91 Cal. Rptr. at 28.
25. Agreed Statement of Facts and Stipulation at 32, 38, 3 Cal. 3d 462,
476 P.2d 423, 91 Cal. Rptr. 23 (1970).
26. 3 Cal. 3d at 471, 476 P.2d at 429, 91 Cal. Rptr. at 29.

Man's development of the area also actively contributed to the
title and boundary problems. Steamshovel Channel, which ran
through the grant, and the tidelands surrounding it were filled and
developed by a private developer in 1923-1924. The activity was undertaken with government approval.27 The area was, however,
specifically excluded from the 1886 tideland patents and was included in the 1924 conveyance of public tidelands to the city as a
part of the state tidelands trust grant. 28 Neither the city nor the
state, at any time, protested the residential use and occupation of
the filled channel, and the precise location of the channel before fill29
ing is now unknown.
Public development of the area also took place despite an awareness on the part of some officials that such problems might exist.
For example, the city commenced work on the Marine Stadium and
related facilities in 1925. In the late 1920's, oil was discovered north
of the Stadium, and the question of ownership claims in that area
arose. The city council requested the city attorney to investigate
the status of titles, but the matter was dropped when the city attorney stated that the investigation had given rise to "uneasiness"
in the property owners, and the quiet title action would call into
question many titles within and without the area, and that the city
had little to gain from such a proceeding.80
The Agreements
The primary purpose of the first agreement, the Belmont ShoresNaples Boundary Settlement (hereinafter referred to as the Belmont agreement), was to settle the title problems of lands described
in section 2(a) of the statute authorizing the agreements. 8' Both
the city and private landowners have a substantial claim of paramount legal title to the area. The city's claim is based on the 1925
trust grant of the tidelands from the state, and the homeowners'
claims are based on the Spanish grant and the tidelands patents. 32
The agreement provides that for consideration of $783,500 to be
paid by the Title Insurance Corporation (a real party in interest),
27. Id. at 471, 476 P.2d at 430, 91 Cal. Rptr. at 30.
28. Id.

29. Id. at 472, 476 P.2d at 430, 91 Cal. Rptr. at 30.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 475, 476 P.2d at 432, 91 Cal. Rptr. at 32. In section 2(a), the
legislature found that lands within the Alamitos Bay area which lie above
the line of mean high tide were no longer necessary or useful for commerce,
fisheries, and navigation and were therefore freed from the public use and
trust. CAL. STAT. § 2(a), ch. 1688 (1965).
32. 3 Cal. 3d at 475, 476 P.2d at 432, 91 Cal. Rptr. at 32.
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the city and state will execute conveyances to settle the title to the
area and resolve the boundary problems. The agreement also disclaimed public interest in the lands inadvertently omitted from the
plat of the original rancho grant.
The second agreement, the McGrath-Macco Boundary Settlement
and Exchange (hereinafter referred to as the McGrath agreement)
deals with the undeveloped lands described in section 2(b) of the
statute authorizing the agreements. These lands lie immediately
north of Long Beach's Marine Stadium and were formed for the
most part by the filling resulting from dredging during the construction of the Stadium.33 This agreement principally provides for
the fixing of boundaries between state lands and McGrath lands
according to a 1966 state survey; for the exchange of 5 acres of
state land for 8.5 acres of McGrath lands; and for the expenditure
of the city tideland trust funds to construct public park and marina
facilities.3 4
The Legal Problem
Article XV section 3 of the California Constitution, which became effective in 1879, provides in pertinent part: "All tidelands
within two miles of any incorporated city, city and county, or town
in this State, and fronting on the water of any harbor, estuary, bay
or inlet used for the purposes of navigation, shall be withheld from
grant or sale to private persons, partnerships, or corporations.
"35

The Long Beach court first considered decisions interpreting
the constitutional provision. The court reaffirmed its holding in
Muchenberger v. City of Santa Monica,3 6 that when the boundary
33. Id. at 476, 476 P.2d at 433, 91 Cal. Rptr. at 33. In section 2(b), the
legislature found that portions of the Alamitos Bay area (other than those
lands described in section 2(a) ), had been filled and reclaimed, were no
longer submerged or below the line of mean high tide, and were thus no
longer necessary or useful for commerce, fisheries, or navigation. CAL.
STAT. § 2(b), ch. 1688 (1965).
34. 3 Cal. 3d at 477, 476 P.2d at 433, 91 Cal. Rptr. at 33.

35. The court defined tidelands as used in this provision to be lands
which were seaward of the mean high tide line at the tine when the
constitutional provision was adopted in 1879 and not at the time of the
proposed alienation, thus including the Alamitos Bay area. Id. at 479,
476 P.2d at 435, 91 Cal. Rptr. at 35.
36. 206 Cal. 635, 275 P. 803 (1929).

between public trust tidelands and private uplands is uncertain, and
the parties genuinely try to determine the boundary and agree to a
line, then the subsequent formal conveyance by the trustee does not
constitute a grant or sale within the meaning of article XV section
that are true boundary
3. Thus, the portions of the two agreements
37
settlements are not unconstitutional.
Secondly, the court considered the application of Atwood v. Hammond,38 a case concerning the alienation of public trust lands included under article XV section 3. A brief explanation of the common law public trust is required for an understanding of the Long
Beach court's decision as to how Atwood was applied. The state's
ownership of public tidelands is not of a proprietary nature, but
rather the state holds the lands in trust for the public purposes of
navigation, commerce, and fisheries. 0 Tidelands subject to the
trust may not be alienated into absolute private ownership, 40 but if
the state finds it necessary or advisable to cut off certain tidelands
from water access and render them useless for trust purposes, the
legislature can declare them free from the trust. When tidelands
have been so freed from the trust and if not subject to the constitutional prohibition against alienation, they can be irrevocably conveyed to absolute private ownership.
The Long Beach court held that Atwood stands for the proposition that article XV section 3 does not forbid alienation of tidelands
within 2 miles of an incorporated city, but only when the lands have
been reclaimed "'as the result of a highly beneficial program of
harbor development,' are relatively small in area, and have been
freed of the public trust by legislative act."41 This principle, according to the court, validated the portion of the McGrath agreement which provided for the exchange of certain reclaimed tide42
lands for other lands.

This principle thus did not apply to the lands described in section
2(a) of the legislation. To the extent they are in fact public tidelands, these lands, which represent the main portion of the Belmont
agreement, remain subject to the constitutional prohibition against
alienation to private persons. 43

37. 3 Cal. 3d at 481, 476 P.2d at 436, 91 Cal. Rptr. at 36.
38. 4 Cal. 2d 31, 48 P.2d 20 (1935).
39. 3 Cal. 3d at 482, 476 P.2d at 437, 91 Cal. Rptr. at 37.
40. CAL.Pus.

RES. CODE

§ 7991 (West 1956).

41. 3 Cal. 3d at 484, 476 P.2d at 439, 91 Cal. Rptr. at 39.
42. Id. at 486, 476 P.2d at 440, 91 Cal. Rptr. at 40.
43. Id. at 486-87, 476 P.2d at 440-41, 91 Cal. Rptr. at 40-41.
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Estoppel
Even though the court found that the legal title to the section 2 (a)
lands was in Long Beach and the state, it was further held that
equitable estoppel would prevent exercise of this title.
To apply equitable estoppel, the court found that four common
elements were necessary: 1) that the party to be estopped was apprised of the true state of his own title or that such knowledge could
be imputed to him in light of the circumstances; 2) that he made the
admission with the express intention to deceive or with such careless and culpable negligence as to amount to constructive fraud;
3) that the other party was without any convenient or ready means
to acquire knowledge of the true state of the title; and 4) that the
other party relied directly upon such admission and would be injured by allowing its truth to be disproved.4 The court found all
the elements present in this case and in regard to the requirement
of constructive fraud stated:
We merely say that the collective conduct of both governmental
entities over the years reaches that degree of culpability interdicted by the doctrine of estoppel and that the principle of justice
and fair dealing
inherent in that doctrine dictates that we apply it
45
in this case.

The court then considered whether the doctrine of equitable estoppel should be applied to a governmental entity. It stated the
rule as follows:
The government may be bound by an equitable estoppel in the
same manner as a private party when the elements requisite to
such an estoppel against a private party are present and, in the
considered view of a court of equity, the injustice which would result from a failure to uphold an estoppel is of sufficient dimension to justify any effect upon public interest or policy which
would result from the raising of an estoppel.46
The court thus found that manifest injustice would be present if
the state ultimately prevailed since the state and city had treated
the lands as if wholly free from trust claims during the development
of the area. It also determined that estoppel would not have a significant deleterious effect on the public policy reflected in article
XV section 3 of the constitution, to insure that certain lands of
44. Id. at 489-91, 476 P.2d at 442-44, 91 Cal. Rptr. at 42-44.
45. Id. at 492, 476 P.2d at 445, 91 Cal. Rptr. at 45.
46. Id. at 496-97, 476 P.2d at 448, 91 Cal. Rptr. at 48.

unique value to the public would not be shorn of that value by ali4
enation into private lands. 7
The court cited two significant factors in reaching its conclusion.
First, the development of the Alamitos Bay area resulted in an
area providing a vast array of public facilities for navigation and
recreation so that alienation into private hands had not resulted in
the area being withdrawn from the public. 4s Second, and of even
greater apparent significance to the court, was its belief that the
combination of government conduct and extensive reliance involved
in the case is rare and will create an extremely narrow precedent
for application in future cases. 49
Comnmnts
The haphazard development of the Alamitos Bay area demonstrates the effect of the failure of the state or the city to take positive and aggressive action to manage the tideland areas. The state
never accurately surveyed the area until it was too late to determine
the boundaries, and the city, although aware of the problem as early
as the 1920's, when building Marine Stadium, ignored it. The historical photographs in the court exhibits show that the land had
few improvements on it in 1920, whereas almost every portion of it
is now developed. 50 Resolution of the problem was thus possible in
the 1920's, when the estoppel argument would not have arisen, and
a large portion of the land could have been saved for public ownership.
By its decision, the court has, however, given new vitality to article XV section 3 and insured that most of the remaining 1600
miles of public tidelands in California,51 at least those within two
miles of any incorporated city or town, will be protected by the constitutional prohibition.5" The proponents of the agreements argued
47. Id. at 500, 476 P.2d at 450, 91 Cal. Rptr. at 50.
48. Query: Which "public" will benefit from the area being an attractive marina in private hands?
49. 3 Cal. 3d at 500, 476 P.2d at 451, 91 Cal. Rptr. at 50-51.
50. Exhibits 11A, lIB, 12A, 12B, 3 Cal. 3d 462, 476 P.2d 423, 91 Cal.
Rptr. 23 (1970).
51. Reply Brief for Petitioners at 17, 3 Cal. 3d 462, 476 P.2d 423, 91
Cal. Rptr. 23 (1970).

52. Tidelands not within two miles of an incorporated city or town are
subject to the public trust discussed in the text at note 39, supra, and to
article XV section 2 of the California Constitution. That section provides,
"No individual, partnership, or corporation, claiming or possessing the
frontage or tidal lands of a harbor... or other navigable waters in this
State, shall be permitted to exclude the right of way to such water whenever it is required for any public purpose ... ; and the legislature shall

Coastal Zone Management
SAN DIEGO LAW EVIEW

for a broad interpretation of past cases involving this section in an
attempt to limit its application. Seeking a declaration that the legislature could free tidelands from the public trust unfettered by the
constitutional provision whenever such lands ceased to be necessary
or useful for navigation, commerce, and fisheries,5 3 they reasoned
that such an interpretation would give needed flexibility to the
4
state and administrative authorities in administering the trust."
Such a policy, however, might subject the tidelands to a piecemeal,
shortsighted, and possibly politically-influenced alienation by the
state and its grantees without regard to the public's interest, now
protected by article XV section 3.
Although not expressly mentioning this danger, the court has declared that the constitutional section retains its plain meaning, and
severely limits the permissible exceptions to it. It limits the Muchenberger exception to bona fide boundary settlements, 55 and it
warns that the circumstances under which the Atwood principle"
can occur are unique and that the prerequisites to apply it must be
"scrupulously observed." 57 No prior decision has given such a
strong and definite meaning to the section.
The result in this case, that is alienating several acres of tidelands literally within the constitutional section, is not inconsistent
with the court's view of article XV section 3; rather, it is justified
by the peculiar facts. Much of the land is reclaimed land, some of it
several blocks from what are now the "de facto tidelands," the ones
of actual use to the public for navigation and other such public trust
enact such laws as will give the most liberal construction to this provision,
so that access to the navigable waters of this State shall be always attainable for the people thereof."
In light of the increasing population and growing importance and scarcity
of all tidelands, the distinction in section 3 of the same article concerning
the two mile limit seems without justification today and consideration
should be given to amending it to protect all tidelands.
Article XV section 2 does not bar absolute private ownership in this
case since the legislature can find the lands are no longer useful for trust
purposes, as they did for the Alamitos Bay lands in question. 3 Cal. 3d at
482, 476 P.2d at 437, 91 Cal. Rptr. at 37.
53. 3 Cal. 3d at 481, 476 P.2d at 437, 91 Cal. Rptr. at 37.
54. Brief for Petitioner at 19-23, 3 Cal. 3d 462, 476 P.2d 423, 91 Cal. Rptr.
23 (1970).
55. 3 Cal. 3d at 481, 476 P.2d at 436, 91 Cal. Rptr. at 36.
56. See text accompanying note 38, supra.
57. 3 Cal. 3d at 485, 476 P.2d at 440, 91 Cal. Rptr. at 40.

purposes. No overriding public interest exists in retaining these
lands, especially when compared to the private owners' extensive
development of the area and their "detrimental" reliance on government action. The court accordingly limits its application of estoppel by warning that "similarly compelling circumstances will not
often reoccur,"5 8 a caveat to those who seek to rely on the case in
the future to claim title to tidelands.5 9
If the California courts in the future continue the trend set in
this case, article XV section 3 will remain a viable and potent
weapon in protecting the state's tidelands.
CANDLESTICK PROPERTIES INC. v. SAN FRNcisco BAY CONsERvATION
AND DEVELOPMENT CO1VtzmssIoN 60
Candlestick Properties is the owner of real property which is
submerged at high tide by the waters of the San Francisco Bay.
In an attempt to utilize this property as a dumping ground for the
deposit of construction debris, Candlestick acquired a land fill permit from the City and County of San Francisco. Pursuant to Government Code section 66632,61 Candlestick applied to the San Francisco Bay Conservation and Development Commission for permission to fill the land in question. In January 1967, the commission
denied the Candlestick application. In review of the commission's
decision, Candlestick petitioned the San Francisco Superior Court
for a writ of mandate and, in the alternative, sought damages for
an alleged taking of the property without just compensation. The
writ of mandate was denied and a demurrer without leave to
amend was sustained for the cause of action for damages.
Candlestick appealed to the First District Court of Appeals of
California. Held: Restrictions imposed upon the filling of private
property in the San Francisco Bay are a valid implementation of the
police power and can not be construed as a taking for constitutional
purposes. The significance of the decision is the recognition in
California of a valid mechanism through which the conservation of
privately owned tidelands can be effectively regulated.6 2
58. Id. at 500, 476 P.2d at 451, 91 Cal. Rptr. at 51.
59. The scope of this note excludes an in depth discussion of the doctrine
of equitable estoppel or the propriety of its application in this case.
60. Candlestick Properties, Inc. v. San Francisco Bay Conservation and
Dev. Comm'n., 11 Cal. App. 3d 557, 89 Cal. Rptr. 897 (1970) [hereinafter
cited as Candlestick].

61. CAL. GovT CODE § 66632 (West 1966).
62. Permit restrictions in coastal zoning in other jurisdictions: CONN.
GEN. STAT. ch. 473, §§ 25-10 to -18 (Supp. 1970-71); ME. Rsv. STAT. ch. 471,
§ 4701 (Supp. 1970-71); MAss. Gxw. LAws ch. 130, § 27a (Supp. 1971); N.J.
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The San FranciscoBay Plan
San Francisco Bay provides protection for wildlife, enhancement
of recreational activities, a beneficial influence upon climate, and
retention of needed aesthetic values. All these benefits are threatened by the lack of regional planning.
San Francisco Bay is, in fact, one of the worst examples of unplanned dredging and filling in the entire country. Dumping, industrial filling, highway construction, and especially uncontrolled
housing developments, have reduced the water area of the bay from
approximately 680 square miles to a little less than 400 square
miles.6 8 Primary factors contributing to the misuse of this area
are diversification of land ownership and lack of a unified planning
commission. The ownership of 50 percent of this area lies in the
state government, 22 percent is occupied by private parties; 23 percent is owned by cities and counties; and 5 percent is allocated to
the federal government.6 4 Such a diversity of interests demands
control by a centralized regulatory agency.
In an effort to unify control of this area, the California legislature
in 1964 inaugurated the San Francisco Bay Conservation Study
Commission. 5 This study commission recommended to the legislature the initiation of a development and conservation commission to
supervise the growing pains of the bay area. In 1965, the legislature enacted the McAteer-Petris Act, which established the San
Francisco Bay Conservation and Development Commission
(BCDC).66

The McAteer-Petris Act primarily provided for the appointment
of a 13 member commission to complete a detailed study and prepare a comprehensive plan for shoreline development. The act further empowered the commission to suspend all fill projects until
67
the completion of the plan.

title 13, § 8(A) (1) -18 (1932); N.Y. CONSERV. LAW §§ 1-0701 to
-0715 (McKinney 1967); N. CAR. GEN. STAT. ch. 113, §§ 113-229 (Supp. 1969).

REV. STAT.

63. SAN FRANcisco
PLAN 3,

BAY CONSERVATION

.AND DEVELOPmENT

CommissIoN,

(January 1969) [hereinafter cited as S.F. Plan 3].

64. Heath, Estuarine Conservation Legislation in the States, 5 LAND &

351 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Heath].
65. CAL. STAT. § 127, ch. 98 (1964).
66. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 66600 (West Supp. 1971).
67. CAL. STATS. § 2941, ch. 1162 (1965) (now CAL. GOV'T CODE § 66604

WATER L. REV.

(West Supp. 1971)).

Early in 1969 the BCDC produced its plan, and on August 7, 1969,
it became law.6 8 The plan permits filling only when public benefits from fill clearly exceed public detriment from the loss of the
water areas.6 9
It is important to note that at the time Candlestick filed its application for fill, the commission plan was not yet adopted. Therefore,
the applicable provisions of the McAteer-Petris Act are the pre-1969
temporary moratorium restrictions.
Candlestick contended that (1) the granting or denial of a permit
to its land was governed by the Hunters Point Reclamation District
Act of 195570 rather than the McAteer-Petris Act, and that (2) the
exercise of the police power in this case constituted a taking without just compensation under the fifth amendment of the United
7
States Constitution.

1

Hunters PointReclamation DistrictAct
The Hunters Point Reclamation District Act of 195572 was enacted due to a compelling economic necessity for reclaiming, draining, and developing tidelands and other submerged lands. 7 3

In es-

sence, it provides for the authorization of fill projects within the
reclamation district. Candlestick contended that this act constituted a specific declaration by the legislature that fill within the
district did not adversely affect the comprehensive plan of the com74

mission.

The court rejected Candlestick's argument on two grounds. Primarily, nothing in the record of the case indicated that the Hunters
Point Reclamation District had determined to fill Candlestick's
parcel by agreement or condemnation. Therefore, the issues concerning the powers of the reclamation district were moot.
Furthermore, the clear intention required for general legislation
to overcome specific legislation was apparent in the McAteer-Petris
Act. 75 The legislature made it evident that their objective in that
68. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 66603 (West Supp. 1971).
69. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 66601 (West Supp. 1971).
70. CAL. WATER CODE APP. § 78 (West 1968).
71. The court entertained other ancillary issues; however, they are not
within the scope of this article.
72. CAL. WATER CODE APP. § 78 (West 1968).
73. CAL. WATER CODE ArP. § 78-1 (West 1968).
74. For cases upholding such a declaration, see Warne v. Harkness, 60
Cal. 2d 579, 387 P.2d 377, 35 Cal. Rptr. 601 (1963); Riley v. Forbes, 193 Cal.
740, 227 P. 768 (1924); People ex. rel. Bd. of State Harbor Comm'rs v.
Pacific Improvement Co., 130 Cal. 442, 62 P. 739 (1900).
75. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 66600 (West 1966).
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act was to attain uniform control of the entire bay.76 If particular
areas of the bay were not within the BCDC's jurisdiction, the objective of comprehensive planning would be frustrated. Thus, the
court determined that "to the extent that the expressions of policy
are in conflict, the BCDC, being more recent in time, should control".77
78

Exercise of the Police Power

In the alternative, Candlestick claimed $50,000 in damages for the
de facto taking of its property. The court denied recovery stating
that such a restriction was not a taking, but a valid exercise of the
police power. 79 The court declared that an undue restriction on the
use of private property was as much a taking for constitutional purposes as appropriating or destroying it; however, merely denying
Candlestick a land fill permit did not amount to an undue restric80
tion on its property.
The court evaded a constitutional discussion of the police power
which was generated by case law cited by Candlestick in support of
its position. 81 The court distinguished cases holding similar enactments as takings on the basis that the commission's regulation was
more reasonable than those cases which found such action a taking.8 2
It is at this point that the court's argument faltered. In order for
the court to reach such a conclusion it necessarily had to find that
the Candlestick property was useful for some other purpose than
76. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 66601 (West 1966).
77. Candlestick at 572, 89 Cal. Rptr. at 901.
78. The term police power has no exact definition. Berman v. Parker,
348 U.S. 26, 32 (1954). It is normally used to signify those governmental
restrictions which may be invoked, without compensation, for the public's
health, safety, or morals. Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113, 146 (1876).
79. Candlestick at 572, 89 Cal. Rptr. at 906.
80. Id.
81. Peacock v. County of Sacramento, 271 Cal. App. 2d 845, 78 Cal.
Rptr. 391 (1969); Dooley v. Town Plan and Zoning Comm'n, 151 Conn. 304,
197 A.2d 770 (1964); Morris County Land Improvement Co. v. Township of
Parsippany-Troy Hills, 40 N.J. 539, 193 A.2d 232 (1963).
82. The court specifically distinguished Dooley v. Town Plan and Zoning Comm'n, 151 Conn. 304, 197 A.2d 770 (1964), by the fact that in Dooley
75 percent of the value of the property had depreciated because of the
restriction.

land fill. However, such a conclusion was not supported by evidence, since no evidence was introduced upon the topic. Although
Candlestick alleged in its second cause of action that the value of the
land was completely valueless, due to the sustained demurrer without leave to amend, no evidence was received in regard to the remaining utility of the property.8 3
In each case upon which the court relied as authority for its position, one factor existed which was not present in the instant case.
Within each of the cited authorities, it was evidenced that the
land was useful for some purpose other than the purpose restricted
by the legislation. Thus, it was mandatory for the court to entertain evidence as to the land's utility. However, the court stated
"[Even if the reasonableness of the regulation is fairly debatable,
the legislative determination will not be disturbed."8 4 Through
such a statement, the court implied that it was not within the judicial realm to determine a specific piece of legislation as a taking
or use of police power, regardless of its form. Such an implication
is unfounded in the law.85 Once again the court evaded a discussion
of the constitutional requisite for a taking under the fifth amendment.86
Another factor also limited the court's adjudication. The court's
decision occurred during a period when the overall bay plan was
still being formulated. It is apparent that the court knew that the
zoning plan being created would be of little use if the interim
moratorium period were not enforced. It would have been destructive to any future plan if, during the period of formulation, parties
seeking to evade the negative affect of such a restriction were permitted to enter upon a course of construction which might defeat
7
the ultimate purpose.8
All authority in support of the court's implementation of the police power 8 revolved about some interim in which permits were denied due to the expectation of an overall plan.8 9
83. Candlestick at 562, 89 Cal. Rptr. at 899.
84. Candlestick at 571, 89 Cal. Rptr. at 905.
85. For an excellent discussion of the dilemma of police power versus
taking, see Sax, Takings and the Police Power, 74 YALE L.J. 36 (1964).
86. Various theories have been posed by the courts in an effort to determine the elements of a constitutional taking: Diminution of Value TheoryUnited States v. Cors, 337 U.S. 325 (1949); Invasion Theory-Miller v. City
of Beaver Falls, 368 Pa. 189, 82 A.2d 34 (1951); Noxious Use Theory-Atchinson T. & S.F. Ry. v. Public Util. Comm'n, 346 U.S. 346 (1953).
87. Miller v. Board of Pub. Works, 195 Cal. 477, 234 P. 381 (1925).
88. Hunter v. Adams, 180 Cal. App. 2d 511, 4 Cal. Rptr. 776 (1960); Lima
v. Woodruff, 107 Cal. App. 285, 290 P. 480 (1930).
89. For other jurisdictions holding opposite in a similar factual pattern,
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The Candlestick decision should, therefore, be limited to its facts.
However, this does not detract from the case's importance. The
legislature and attorney general had previously recognized the bay
as a body of water, housing valuable natural resources, rather than a
piece of real estate.9 0 The Candlestick decision lends support to the
legislative priority of preserving the California tidelands. 9 1
Conclusion
As the government becomes more sensitive to the impact of human activity upon the environment, regulation of land use becomes
recognized as essential to the health of our society. The police
power must remain flexible to respond to modern needs. However,
this flexibility should not extend into the realm of constitutionally
protected rights. This is not a new problem; rather, it has plagued
the courts for decades. Many commentators have referred to the
Supreme Court's determinations of takings versus police power as
"the crazy quilt pattern of the Supreme Court Doctrine." 92 There
are no rigid rules or formulae available to determine where regulation ends and taking begins.9 3 Therefore, a solution to this problem
is not easily ascertained. The feasibility of long-range utilization of
police power in tideland management would necessarily render
some property owners with virtually worthless land. On the other

see Commissioner of Natural Resources v. S. Volpe & Co., 349 Mass. 104,
206 N.E.2d 666 (1965)-The Supreme Court of Massachusetts in a suit to
enjoin a filling of a salt marsh by the commissioner, remanded the case to
determine whether the property owner had been deprived of any worthwhile right or benefit in his land by action of the commissioner. See also
City of Phoenix v. Burke, 9 Ariz. App. 395, 452 P.2d 722 (1969); Dooley v.
Town Plan and Zoning Comm'n, 151 Conn. 304, 197 A.2d 770 (1964); Morris
County Land Improvement Co. v. Township of Parsippany-Troy Hills, 40
N.J. 539, 193 A.2d 232 (1963).
90. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 66600 (West 1966).
91. It was also contended by Candlestick that the public trust, as
elaborated in the common law and in the California Constitution at article X and article I section 25 was an independent basis which sustains the
validity of the McAteer-Petris Act. CAL. GOV'T

CODE

§ 66600 (West 1966).

92. Dunham, Griggs v. Allegeny County in Perspective; Thirty Years of
Supreme Court ExpropriationLaw, 1962 S. CT. REV. 63 (1962).
93. Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590, 594 (1962); U.S. v. Caltex (Phillipines) Inc., 344 U.S. 149, 156 (1952); Consolidated Rock Products
Co. v. Los Angeles, 57 Cal. 2d 515, 370 P.2d 342, 20 Cal. Rptr. 638, appeal
dismissed, 371 U.S. 36 (1962).

hand, in order to fund compensation for such tidelands, an extraordinary expenditure would be required by the region's taxpayers. 94
The legislature has remained quiescent on the issue of tideland
management for too long. However, the BCDC is a step in the
right direction. Although, the Candlestick decision contains a number of questionable determinations, it is a basis upon which subsequent decisions may build and improve.9 The important factor
is that the legislature and courts have now officially recognized
the problem.
ZABEL v. TABB 96

Conservation of natural resources, preservation of ecological life
cycles, and maintenance of the aesthetic qualities of nature have become major concerns of the United States. Congress, legislatures,
and courts have responded to public concern with legislation and
decisions which emphasize the importance of the above factors. The
purpose of this section of the article is to summarize and analyze
one decision of the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, in the case of
Zabel v. Tabb. Several timely inquiries are to be posed and de-

tailed in an attempt to alert the reader to these issues.
The case of Zabel v. Tabb was commenced in 1967 in the United

States District Court for the Middle District of Florida at Tampa.
It was filed in response to a refusal by the Army Corps of Engineers
and the Secretary of the Army to issue a permit to dredge and fill
a portion of navigable waters in Boca Ciega Bay, near St. Petersburg, Florida.
Zabel owned riparian land on the bay and adjacent land underlying the bay. He desired to dredge and fill the underlying property to construct thereon a trailer park. The park was to be con-

nected to the adjacent upland by a bridge or a culvert. After obtaining the requisite state authorization, 9 7 Zabel requested a federal
94. Much of this tideland area is held in fee. The parcel owned by
Candlestick was originally sold into private ownership by the Board of
Tideland Commissioners. See Act of March 30, ch. 543, at 716, CAL.
STATS. (1867-68). Indications from previous cases were that underwater
lands sold by this Board in San Francisco Bay had been conveyed into
private ownership pursuant to a plan in furtherance of commerce and navigation and therefore the purchasers received full fee title. See text accompanying notes, 38-40, supra.
95. The only other BCDC case involving utilization of the police power
was People ex rel. San Francisco Bay Conservation and Dev. Comm'n v.

Town of Emmeryville, 69 Cal. 2d 533, 446 P.2d 90, 98 Cal. Rptr. 790 (1968).
96. 430 F.2d 199 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 39 U.S.L.W. 3360 (U.S. Feb.
22, 1971) [hereinafter cited as Zabel].
97. Zabel's application to the Pinellas County Water and Navigation
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dredge and fill permit from the Corps of Engineers. The District
Engineer, Colonel Tabb, held a public hearing regarding the issuance of a permit. At the hearing the Pinellas County Water and
Navigation Control Authority, 98 the Board of County Commissioners of Pinellas County, the Florida Board of Conservation, and
approximately 700 individuals filed protests. The United States
Fish and Wildlife Service, a part of the Department of the Interior,
also opposed the issuance on the grounds that it would be harmful
to the fish and wildlife resources in Boca Ciega Bay.
Upon the conclusion of the hearing, the District Engineer recommended the refusal of the permit. The recommendation was supported by the Division Engineer and the Chief Engineer. Finally,
the Secretary of the Army refused to issue the permit on the
grounds that it:
1. Would result in a distinctly harmful effect on the fish and
wildlife resources in Boca Ciega Bay,
2. Would be inconsistent with the purposes of the Fish and

Wildlife Coordination Act of 1958, as amended (16 U.S.C. 662),
3. Is opposed by the Florida Board of Conservation on behalf of
the State of Florida, and by the County Health Board of Pinellas
County and the Board of County Commissioners of Pinellas
County, and

4. Would be contrary to the public interest.99

In response to Zabel's contention that the proposed work would
not hinder navigation and that therefore the Secretary had no authority to deny the permit, the district court granted summary
judgment for Zabel and ordered the issuance of a permit, subject to
appeal.
The court of appeal reversed the district court decision and
granted Tabb's original motion for summary judgment. In so holdControl Authority, was initially rejected by that agency, and that rejection was sustained by the Florida District Court of Appeal in Zabel v.
Pinellas County Water and Navigation Control Authority, 154 So. 2d 181
(Fla. Ct. App. 1963). The Florida Supreme Court reversed on the grounds
that the agency had the burden of proving any adverse effect to the
public interest, rather than Zabel showing no adverse effect; Zabel v.
Pinellas County Water and Navigation Control Authority, 171 So. 2d 376
(Fla. 1965). In response, the District Court of Appeal directed the issuance
of the permit; Pinellas County Water and Navigation Control Authority v.
Zabel, 179 So. 2d 370 (Fla. Ct. App. 1965).
98. The same State agency which, by court order, issued the locally required permit.
99. Zabel at 202.

ing, the court said that the "... Secretary of the Army can refuse
to authorize a dredge and fill project in navigable waters for factually substantial ecological reasons even though the project would
not interfere with navigation .. .."100

Each issue articulated by

the court in reaching the above holding will be dealt with separately.
The court began its examination of the issues by referring to the
commerce clause 1° ' for the congressional authority to regulate tidelands. The court formulated the test of congressional power to
protect wildlife in navigable waters, a power superior to private
property rights, on the basis of whether or not the activity of the
individuals to be regulated has a "substantial effect on interstate
commerce."' 0 2 The court then dismissed any doubt of the activity
falling within the penumbra of the commerce clause by a short,
tongue-in-cheek explanation aimed at Zabel, and a footnote commenting on Zabel's narrow vision. 0 3 Therefore, because dredge
and fill operations tend to destroy the ecological balance (fish and
wildlife) and because they have a substantial effect on interstate
commerce, the court found that Congress has the power to regulate
such operations.
In anticipation of the above finding, Zabel argued that Congress
relinquished the power to regulate such operations to the states in
the Submerged Lands Act,'0 4 and only retained power over matters
of navigation, flood control, and hydroelectric power. 10 5 The court
noted the strength of the above argument 0 0 but rather than adopting it, looked to other portions of the same legislation for a more
definite interpretation of what power had been relinquished and
what power had been retained. To clarify the distribution of power,
the court looked to the following sections of the Submerged Lands
Act:
The United States retains all its navigational servitude and rights
in and powers of regulation and control of said lands and navigable waters for the constitutional purposes of commerce, navigation, national defense, and international affairs, all of which

shall be paramount to, but shall not be deemed to include, proprie-

100. Id. at 203.
101. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
102. Zabel at 203, citing Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 125 (1942).
103. Zabel at 203-04. There the court notes that there could hardly be
any question of the activity meeting the stated test. Then the court footnotes Zabel's cases cited against the commerce clause proposition pointing
out that both of them were decided prior to either United States v. Darby,
312 U.S. 100 (1941) or Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942).
104. 43 U.S.C. §§ 1301 et. seq. (1964).
105. See 43 U.S.C. §§ 1301(e), 1311(a), (b), (d) (1964).
106. Zabel, supra note 96, at 205.
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tary rights of ownership, or the rights of management, administration .... 107
Zabel argued that the retention mentioned in the quote refers only
to navigation, flood control, and hydroelectric power with all other
power being relinquished. Therefore, he contended that this section was consistent with the section mentioned earlier. 0 8 However, the court interpreted the section just quoted to mean that
congressional power over other types of commerce was not relinquished to the states. The court stated that ". . . to hold that it is
an explicit reservation of all commerce powers gives the section
meaning."'1 9 The court concluded that there was no relinquishment of commerce power through the Submerged Lands Act to
regulate the use of tidelands for conservation purposes.
After first determining that Congress had the power to regulate
tidelands on commerce grounds and further determining that concern for fish and wildlife was within the power, the court turned
its attention to what power had been delegated to the Secretary of
the Army and Corps of Engineers. The court examined the original
delegating statute to determine the initial scope of the power of the
Corps of Engineers. The court's examination continued by analyzing subsequent legislation, as well as cases and congressional reports, in an attempt to accurately define the criteria to be used by
the Corps of Engineers in exercising their power.
The major issue confronting the court was under what conditions
the Secretary of the Army could either grant or deny the permit.
The congressional grant, or delegation of authority to the Secretary of the Army and Corps of Engineers, was found in the Rivers
and Harbors Act." 0 The Act forbids any obstruction to the navigable capacity of United States waters without express permission of
Congress or the Secretary of the Army. The Act does not detail any
guidelines for the Secretary of the Army to grant or deny a permit.
However, the court pointed out that there has been a generally ac107. 43 U.S.C. § 1314(a) (1964) (emphasis added).
108. 43 U.S.C. §§ 1311(a)-(d) (1964).
109. Zabel, supra note 96, at 206.
110. 33 U.S.C. § 403 (1964): "The creation of any obstruction not affirmatively authorized by Congress, to the navigable capacity of any of the
waters of the United States is prohibited; . . . unless the work has been
recommended by the Chief of Engineers and authorized by the Secretary
of the Army prior to beginning the same."

cepted rule-of-reason approach taken by the Secretary of the Army
under specific conditions. These specific issues were at issue.
Zabel contended that the denial of the permit could only be based
on navigational grounds."1
The Corps countered with an abundance of authority supporting the view that the permit might be
denied for reasons other than navigational." 2 By starting with an
early example of a case denying a permit for other than naviga-

tional interference, United States ex. rel. Greathouse v. Dern,118
the court took a methodological approach in resolving the issue.
The court also cited the recent case of Citizens Comm. for the Hud111. Zabel cited for the proposition in the text, the case of Miami
Beach Jockey Club Inc. v. Dern, 86 F.2d 135 (1936), and a United States
Attorney General's Opinion, 30 U.S. Att. Gen. Ops. 410 (Feb. 13, 1925). It
should be noted, however, that both authorities are old and do not reflect
the present attitude of the Attorney General or the courts. Colonel Tabb
cited more than ample authority to overcome Zabel's position, infra note
112.
112. In his brief, Colonel Tabb cited the following statutes, congressional
reports, and cases in the following order in support of his position that the
Secretary of the Army may refuse a permit on grounds other than navigational. Fish and Wildlife Coordination Act, 48 STAT. § 401 (1934) as
amended, 16 U.S.C. §§ 661-66 (1964) (discussed infra, text accompanying
note 114); SENATE COMMITTEE ON INTERSTATE AND FOREIGN COMMERCE, S.
REP. No. 1981, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. (1958) (shows legislative history of 1958
amendments to the Fish and Wildlife Coordination Act, and Congress'
concern for ecology); Memorandum of Understanding, July 13, 1967 (entered
into by the Secretary of the Army and the Secretary of the Interior requiring Corps of Engineers to obtain a satisfactory ecological/environmental
report from the appropriate agency prior to issuing a dredge and fill permit); H.R. REP. No. 91-113, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969) ("...the corps and
the Department have the duty,

. .

.to consider the effect of the proposed

work upon the total public interest and not merely upon navigation.").
Colonel Tabb analogized from similar legislation affecting other agencies;
the Fish and Wildlife Act, 70 Stat. § 1119 (1956), as amended 16 U.S.C.
§ 742 (a) (1964) (that fish and wildlife are important to the strength of the
Nation); the Water Resources Planning Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1962 (Supp. I 1965)
("...
. the policy of the Congress to encourage the conservation, development, and utilization of water and related land resources . . . on a comprehensive and coordinated basis by the Federal Government .. ."); the

Marine Resources and Engineering Development Act, 33 U.S.C. § 110(a)
(1966) (itis".

.

. the policy of the U.S. to develop....

a coordinated...

program in marine science); Federal-Aid Highway Act, 23 U.S.C. § 138
(Supp. V 1970) (requiring the Secretary of Transportation to cooperate with
the Secretary of the Interior on environmental matters before permitting
highway construction). The cases used by Tabb were: United States v.
Republic Steel Corp., 362 U.S. 482 (1960); Sanitary District v. United
States, 266 U.S. 405 (1925); Scenic Hudson Preservation Conference v. Federal Power Commission, 354 F.2d 608 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied sub
nom. Consolidated Edison Co. v. Scenic Hudson Preservation Conference,
384 U.S. 941 (1966); United States v. Dern, 289 U.S. 352 (1933).
113. 289 U.S. 352 (1933), the permit was denied for construction of a
wharf because the land was to be condemned by the United States for
highway purposes and the wharf would increase the cost to the government.
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son Valley v. Volpe"1 4 for the same proposition. In continuing, however, the court did not feel the necessity of depending on the indirect analogy of case-by-case explanations. Instead, the court rested
its decision upon two statutes, the Fish and Wildlife Coordination
Act"1 5 and the National Environmental Policy Act. 1 6
It was found that the Fish and Wildlife Coordination Act requires "... the dredging and filling agency . . . , whether public
or private, to consult with the Fish and Wildlife Service, with a view
of conservation of wildlife resources." 1 7 The court reasoned that
if Congress desired to regulate private dredge and fill projects because of environmental effects, it would be reasonable for the only
federal agency licensing such projects to consider ecological find-

ings of the Fish and Wildlife Service. In support of the above interpretations, the court cited a Senate Report"'5 from the legislative
history of the Act. Secondly, the court cited Udall v. Federal
Power Commission where the interpretation of the Act was directly
on point.110 Finally, the court alluded to a Memorandum of Understanding entered into between the Secretary of the Army and
the Secretary of the Interior requiring the Corps of Engineers,
114. 302 F. Supp. 1083 (S.D.N.Y. 1969), aff'd, 425 F.2d 97 (2d Cir. 1970),
because the Secretary of Transportation must consider environmental impact in approving the route of any new highways, the Corps of Engineers
could not issue a fill permit when the overall effect of the fill would be to
force the Secretary of Transportation to accept the route without considering the requisite factors. Therefore, the Army could not be oblivious to the
effect of the fill on beauty and conservation of natural resources.
115. 16 U.S.C. §§ 661-66 (1964).
116. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4331-47 (Supp. V 1970).
117. Zabel, supra note 96, at 20R.
118. S. REP. No. 1981, 85th Cong., 2d Sess., 2 U.S. CODE CONG. AND
AD. NEws 3446 (1958): "The amendments, would provide that wildlife
conservation shall receive equal consideration with other features in the
planning of Federal water resource development programs. This would
have the effect of putting fish and wildlife on the basis of equality with
flood control, irrigation, navigation, and hydroelectric power in our water
resource programs, which is highly desirable and proper, and represents
an objective long sought by conservationists of the Nation." Id. at 3450.
119. 387 U.S. 428, 443-44 (1967). The court gave the following meaning
to the Act:
Section 2 (a) .

.

. provides that an agency evaluating a license under

which the waters of any stream or other body of water are proposed .

.

. to be impounded first shall consult with the United

States Fish and Wildlife Service, Department of the Interior ...
with a view to the conservation of wildlife resources ....

Cer-

tainly the wildlife conservation aspect of the project must be
explored and evaluated.

upon receipt of an application for a dredge and fill permit, to notify
all interested state and federal conservation and environmental
agencies. The District Engineer must then evaluate all relevant information received from the state and federal conservation
and environmental agencies in deciding whether or not to issue the
permit.

1 20

The court utilized the statute, the case, and the memorandum as
examples of the combined intent of the several branches of the federal government to compel the Secretary of the Army to "...
[w] eigh the effect a dredge and fill project will have on conserva121

tion before he issues a permit lifting the Congressional ban.1

Through dicta, the circuit court found support for its decision in
the National Environmental Policy Act.1 22 That act requires every
federal agency to consider ecological data when dealing with any
123
activity having a potential effect upon the environment.
The cumulative effect of the authorities cited above led the circuit court to finally conclude:
For we hold that while it is still the action of the Secretary of the
Army on the recommendation of the Chief of Engineers, the Army
must consult with, consider and receive, and then evaluate the
recommendations of all of these other agencies articulately on all
these environmental factors. In rejecting a permit on non-navigational grounds, the Secretary of the Army does not abdicate his
sole ultimate responsibility and authority. Rather in weighing the
application, the Secretary of the Army is acting under a Congressional mandate to collaborate and consider all of these factors. (citation omitted).
When the House Report and the National Environmental Policy
Act of 1969 are considered together with the Fish and Wildlife
Coordination Act and its interpretations, there is no doubt that
the Secretary can refuse on conservation
grounds to grant a per24
mit under the Rivers and Harbors Act.1
The preceding discussion has illustrated a changing attitude in
government and in the courts toward the environment. Environmental protection and ecological awareness are principles which
permeate most aspects of American life. The manner in which
Zabel v. Tabb is to play a part in environmental involvement, and
the manner in which the public may use the case as a tool are
120. Zabel, supra note 96, at 210-11.
121. Id.
122. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4331-47 (Supp. V 1970) (note that this Act was passed
subsequent to the District Court decision in this case) (See, Recent Develpments in the Law of the Seas: A Synopsis, 7 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 627, 640
(1970).)
123. See text accompanying notes 152 et. seq. infra.
124. Zabel, supra note 96, at 213-14.
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questions of interest to the concerned reader. A discussion of these
issues and others will be developed in the following section, concentrating on tidelands management and control.
ANALYsIs
The foregoing discussion was designed to provide an individual
evaluation of each of the three cases. This analysis is designed to
extrapolate from the prior discussion possible ramifications and
applications of the principles cited, in order to demonstrate how
the courts can implement the legislative intent to provide for the
preservation of the tidelands.
City of Long Beach v. Mansell
This case demonstrates the concern of the court with implementation of the public policy implicit in the provisions of article XV,
section 3 of the California Constitution that the tidelands are to be
preserved as a public trust for the people of California. That the
various governmental entities either disregarded this public policy,
or were powerless to effectuate it until 1965 is apparent from the
stipulated facts. The natural resources of the Alamitos Bay region
were particularly suited for exploitation as a highly desirable residential marina complex. The policy of benign neglect practiced by municipal and state government in no way hampered those
that sought to maximize their economic gains. The effects of this
haphazard development over a period of 100 years on the ecology of
the Los Angeles-Long Beach coastal zone may never be known, however beneficial the development has ultimately proven to be
for the
125
human inhabitants as residential and recreational facilities.
The public trust concepts of coastal zone management, having de1 26
rived from English common law, are well documented elsewhere.
Accordingly, the vast majority of American jurisdictions have
adopted this theory to preclude the alienation of the tidelands by
the state save in isolated instances and then only for bona-fide "public uses", subject to the state's navigational servitude.127 Cali125.
126.
§ 36.3
127.

See text accompanying notes 21-30, supra.
Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1 (1894); see 1 Water and Water Rights
(Clark ed. 1967).
See Port of Seattle v. Oregon & W. R.R., 255 U.S. 56 (1921); but see

fornia, by the use of constitutional provisions, statutes, and application of the common law, has attempted to preserve the tidelands
for the people of the state. Until the decade of the Sixties, this express public policy was observed more in the breach than in the
execution.'2 8 The distaste of the court to breach the "public trust,"
despite. the obvious need to provide a solution to the question of
title instability in the Alamitos Bay region and the legislative action designed to alleviate the problem, is manifested by the precision with which the court limited the holding to the specific facts
before it.12 9
Since the California Constitution prohibits alienation in fee of
the tidelands within two miles of a municipality, 80 it is arguable
that this provision could be in conflict with any overall coastal
development that proposes as an integral part of the plan to sell a
portion of the tidelands to a private entity. On the other hand, the
courts would be willing to uphold the validity of any such plan,
provided that the programmed alienation met the requirement of
article XV, section 3 prohibiting alienation in fee to private parties,
and was delineated for the purposes of navigation, commerce, public right of access or fisheries. Because section 3 applies only to
those lands within two miles of an incorporated city in existence in
1879,131 here remains a considerable proportion of the California
coastline subject only to the general concepts of "public trusts" as
embodied in the common law, legislative enactments and section 2
of the California Constitution.
Governmental Estoppel
As noted in the prior discussion on Long Beach, 32 estoppel applied to a governmental entity is a rarely used doctrine, particularly
when used to derogate the provisions of the state's constitution.
However, the use of equitable estoppel as a meaningful tool to implement a broad based comprehensive coastal zone plan and possibly
protect it from federal diminuation should be considered. 183 Where
Wilbour v. Callagan, 77 Wash. 2d 307, 462 P.2d 232 (1969); see also 1
Water and Water Rights § 36.4 (Clark ed. 1967).

128. E.g., Long Beach at 471-73, 91 Cal. Rptr. at 29, 476 P.2d at 429.

129. See text accompanying notes 55-59, supra.
130. CAL. CONST. art. XV, § 3.
131. Long Beach at 478-79, 91 Cal. Rptr. at 34, 476 P.2d at 434; see text
accompanying note 35, supra.
132. See text accompanying notes 55-59, supra.
133. See Morreale, FederalPower in Western Waters, 3 NAT. RES. J. 1, 67
(1963), for an evaluation of the application of equitable estoppel against
the federal government in the context of consumptive water rights in
western states.
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the people of the state, acting through their legislature, have provided for such a plan'3 4 in reliance on both inaction by the federal
government and federal pronouncements to the effect that the
states have the primary responsibilities in the coastal zone, it is arguable that the federal government could be estopped from imposing a management program with less stringent standards than that
of the state. 35 For example: the Submerged Lands Act of 19531386
quitclaimed the submerged lands three miles to seaward of a state's
contiguous zone; should the federal government establish a coastal
zone management plan pre-empting the state from its territorial
waters under the supremacy clause, it appears that estoppel as applied in Long Beach could be applied to preserve the state's primary
rights. This hypothetical argument could be subject to a broad
based commerce power attack; which has often been described as
plenary, 37 especially here, where the commerce power in the contiguous zone was expressedly reserved to the federal government. 188
The pivotal issue in any such litigation would be whether the state
could have justifiably relied on the Submerged Lands Act and the
governmental inactivity in the contiguous zone.
That this problem will not arise in the near future is clearly demonstrated by the mood of Congress, which has based the majority
of recent enactments concerning the interstate problems of environment on the primary duty of the state to formulate policy, effectuate minimum standards matching the federal standards, and
implement and enforce regulations pertaining to those standards,
3 9
with some federal financial assistance and management expertise.
134. Such as the California Ocean Area Plan (COAP) scheduled for
publication in 1972. 2N CMC REP. supranote 10, at 79.
135. See discussion accompanying notes 195-200, infra.
136. 43 U.S.C. §§ 1301 et seq. (1964).
137. Zabel supra note 96, at 203-04.
138. Submerged Lands Act of 1953, 43 U.S.C. § 1314 (1964).
139. E.g., S. REP. No. 91-351, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 37 (1969):
The basis for the [Water Quality Control Act] is a strong Federal-

State-local partnership. The States have been delegated the pri-

mary responsibility to protect and enhance the quality of air and
water within their boundaries, and, in co-operation with other
states, to protect and enhance the quality of air and water within
resource areas common to those States. The Federal Government
has the responsibility to improve our understanding of environmental threats, the authority to act where States fail or are unable to fulfill their obligations and the obligation to protect the
environment in its own activities.

Candlestick Properties,Inc. v. San FranciscoBay Conservation and
Development Commission
The San Francisco Bay Conservation and Development Commission of the State of California (BCDC) is one of the few regional
development and planning organizations functioning at the state
level anywhere in the United States.1 40 The BCDC was established
to meet the planning and development needs of a specific geographic
area, and thus may be subject to criticism as "piecemeal legislation." However, the scope and power of the BCDC as defined in
the statute141 establishing the commission, was sufficiently broad to
preclude such an attack. The actual operations of the commission
indicates that the BCDC concept has worked so well as to provide a
model for other jurisdictions considering the regional planning con42
cept.
The key to BCDC's success has been the fact that it has been adequately funded to perform its tasks,' 4 3 a characteristic not shared
by other state management plans. 44 Funding may be the most important aspect of establishing a coastal zone planning and development organization no matter what the scope of its powers and authority. For example, the first step that must be undertaken in order to have an effective coastal zone plan, is to inventory available
assets. To conduct this inventory, an organization needs an adequately sized staff, 45 access to technical expertise, and the ability
to absorb administrative costs. 46 Because the BCDC has been
established with the requisite funding and has fulfilled its legislative mandate, it has been cited as contributing significantly to the
solution of coastal/estuarine management problems of central Cali4
fornia.' '
The action taken by the court of appeals is significant in perpetuating developmental and planning efforts by state and regional management commissions. By upholding the validity of the
powers of the BCDC to deny permits, the court implicitly recognizes the fact that once an area within the coastal zone is reclaimed
by dredge and fill operations, the biotic communities thereby de140. See Heath supra note 64, at 355-66.
141. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 66603 (West 1966).
142. Accord, Heath supra note 64, at 257-59.
143. Id.

144. 3 MA=n~ LAw supra note 10, at 531; 2ND CMC REP. supra note 10, at 7.
145. For example, the BCDC had 13 full time members. S.F. PLAN
3 supra note 63, at 3.
146. For the result when adequate funds are not provided, see 2ND CMC
REP. supra note 10, at 7.

147. 2N CMC REP. supra note 10, at 5; see Heath supra note 64, at
355 et seq.
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stroyed can never be replaced. By allowing the BCDC to implement a plan for coastal zone management and construing the legislative intent of the BCDC enabling act to preserve the power of the
BCDC to deny the fill permit, the court recognized that any prospective diminution of the present state of the San Francisco Bay
Region by Candlestick Properties, Inc. must be subordinated to the
legislatively mandated requirements for regional planning and establishment of competing use priorities by the BCDC.
The Public Interest
Defining the public interest is important, since the validity of the
state's exercise of its police power under the Constitution depends
on whether or not the particular application of the police power is
for the "public health, safety, morals or welfare.' 14 As expressed
in the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA)

149 it

is

in the national interest to:
(1) fulfill the responsibilities of each generation as trustee of
the environment for succeeding generations;
(2) assure for all Americans safe, healthful, productive, and
esthetically and culturally pleasing surroundings;
(3) attain the widest range of beneficial uses of the environment without degradation, risk to health or safety, or other undesirable and unintended consequences;
(5) achieve a balance between population and resource use
which will permit high standards of living and a wide sharing of
life's amenities .... 150
On the issue of reasonableness, the congressional determination of
the public interest by NEPA may well be "well-nigh conclusive,"1 51

should a state adopting these standards enact a coastal zone management plan. The concept of public welfare as applied to the
state's exercise of the police power will be upheld by the Supreme
Court if "any state of facts either known or which could reasonably
be assumed affords support" for the legislation.' 52
Although the policies enumerated in the NEPA are necessarily
broad, they are directly applicable to concepts of coastal zone man148.
149.
150.
151.
152.

Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 31 (1954).
Pub. L. No. 91-190, § 101(b) (Jan. 1, 1970).
Id.
348 U.S. at 32.
Goldblatt v. Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590, 596 (1962).

agement. The optimum plan provides for a regional agency established by the legislature to inventory all available assets, both
natural and man-made, within the coastal zone region, then projecting the needs of the population into the foreseeable future. The
agency assigns priorities in accordance with specific legislative
guidelines between beneficial and deleterious uses (which are often
competing). Finally the agency develops a plan from which it is
hoped the ecology of the region will be enhanced. 1 3 Each of these
processes involves balancing private rights against the public welfare.
The Candlestick court recognized the "strong public purpose" of
the BCDC enabling act, and implicitly upheld the power of the leg1 4
islature to delegate the authority to withhold the fill permit. 5
Inverse Condemnation 55

The concept of inverse condemnation arises whenever the state,
in the exercise of its police power, regulates the private landowner's use of his property, depriving him of present and/or future
utilization of that land as he desires.1 50 In Candlestick and Zabel,
the regulation took the form of a denial of permission to fill submerged lands adjacent to the private owner's land, and the contention in each case was that by denying the owner the right to make
profitable use of his land, that the government had "taken" his
land unconstitutionally and he was entitled to compensation under
the fifth amendment (inverse condemnation).
The fact that Candlestick Properties, Inc. can make a reapplication
for the fill permit, after the plan is formulized, takes the case out of
the context of condemnation and into area of a valid exercise of the
police power by the BCDC. The regulation is reasonable, since it is
157
for a short duration and a valid public purpose.
The difficult issue is when does the state's exercise of the police
power to regulate the property holder become an unconstitutional
153. Accord, Heath supra note 64, at 371; Power supra note 10, at 227;
supra note 10, at 145.
The power to plan and regulate the entire coastal zone should be vested in
a single state agency with sufficient funds to implement the plan, subject to
legislative and judicial review.
154. Candlestick at 565, 89 Cal. Rptr. at 901.
155. For the California definition, see Cothran v. San Jose Water Works,
58 Cal. 2d 608, 614, 25 Cal. Rptr. 569, 573, 375 P.2d 449, 453 (1962).
156. See note 85, supra.
157. Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926); Nectow
v. Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183 (1928).
2ND CMC REP. supra note 10, at 1-3; 1 MAiNE LAw
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taking.158 This problem will arise when and if Candlestick Properties, Inc. makes reapplication under the legislatively approved plan
and is rejected by the BCDC. The lack of case law on the precise
question of the state's application of its law to the physical alteration of the tidelands problem 5 9 increases the importance of Candlestick in providing precedent for national application. 160
The definition of an unconstitutional taking depends on the reasonableness of the restriction on the landowner's use.' 0 ' If a court
were to apply the concept of inverse condemnation to compensate
the private landowner, on the owner's showing that the particular
land has no other "use" except when filled and developed, contradictory to a state's regulation of that land through a coastal zone plan,
the court would be missing the entire concept of coastal zone management. The basic premise underlying all coastal zone plans is to
provide a reasonable balancing of all possible uses to which the entire region can be put.112 As applied to a particular plot of land,
this determination results from a finding by the agency involved
that there is a use of legislatively mandated higher priority than the
dredge and fill operation desired by the landowner. The owner
benefits with the public at large by the improvement in the ecology
of the entire region occasioned by implementation of the management plan. These higher priority uses to which his land can be put
should be upheld as reasonable regulations.
Possible Solutions
There are two solutions to avoid the problem of inverse condemnation. The first is to provide an adequately funded acquisition program under the auspices of the regional management commission, which, after a fair and public hearing, would compensate
the landowner for the alleged taking.1 3 The cost of treating all restrictive use regulation as a condemnation would be prohibitive. 164
158. See Michelman, Just Compensation, 80 HInv. L. REV. 1165 (1967);
a detailed analysis of the prevailing theories concerning "taking" versus
"regulation."
159. Heath supra note 64, at 360.
160. See discussion accompanying notes 93-95, supra.
161. Cases cited supra note 157.
162. See, e.g., Power supra note 10, at 597, for an evaluation of coastal
zone statutes cited earlier.
163. Heath supra note 64, at 359-60.
164. For example, the cost of rehabilitating Lake Erie is twenty billion

The second alternative is to draft the statute/regulation in such a
manner as to provide meaningful and reasonable priorities between
competing uses, and to found the legislation on the public trust doctrine, and the constitutional provisions. By having the legislature
define "reasonable restriction" in the constitutional terms of the
bonafide public purposes of navigation, commerce, public right of
access, or fisheries, the exercise of authority by the management
and development commission can be extended to properly implement the plan.1 5 Then the decision of a duly constituted planning commission, acting under legislative mandate as to priorities,
that a particular restriction placed on the filling of a single parcel
of tidelands pursuant to a comprehensive and well developed regional plan, would be held reasonable. Zoning restrictions (that
vary considerably in area and longevity) have been consistently
upheld as not being unlawful "takings" so long as there was no foreclosure of the pre-existing uses without compensation. 0 0
A development plan for the coastal zone has many of the same
aspects as a zoning plan. Both the tidelands plan and zoning
regulation are primarily prospective in nature and promote the
general welfare although in different contexts.1 7 In the tidelands,
the needs of the individual to develop his land so as to enjoy an
economic gain must give way to the needs of a citizen to live in an
enhanced environment'0 8 made possible only by a weighing and
evaluating process that has projected the needs of society over the
foreseeable future.
However, it should be recognized that the duty of the state to roll
back the wave of urbanization and population growth in the tidelands area through the use of a general development plan would
necessitate an aggressive and extensive reclamation and rehabilitation program within the tidelands.
One of the methods by which the state can accomplish this is to
provide for open purchasing of private land holdings utilizing
condemnation machinery when required. 169 Although this part of
dollars, Seaborg, Hope for the Environment, TAx NEW YoRK TimES ENCYCLOPEDIA ALmANAC-1971, at 463 (1970).
For the cost analysis of a single
intrastate region, see S.F.

PLAN

3 supranote 61.

165. 369 U.S. at 593-94.

166. 272 U.S. 365; accord, Dooley v. Town Zoning Commission, 151
Conn. 304, 197 A.2d 770 (1964) (holding that since the zoning restriction

precluded any profitable use of the land, it was a confiscatory taking).
167. The coastal zone plan is concerned with all of the possible competing uses, while the zoning ordinance traditionally has been concerned
with urban growth and economic development. 2 MAiNE LAw supra note 10.
168. See discussion accompanying notes 7-10, supra.
169. For example, over the past 120 years, 225 land grants have been
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the coastal zone plan may require massive expenditures, the benefits
to be derived from planning and optimal utilization of the coastal
zone may outweigh the immediate costs.
Another alternative is to enact legislation providing for useful
life amortizaton of deleterious, pre-existing, non-conforming uses.
Although this method retains title in the private owner, it may
provide the more economical approach for state governments.
The Candlestick rationale, if applied to the final San Francisco
Bay plan, containing the inevitable restrictions on private uses,
could prove to be a powerful tool in the hands of a commission
implementing the policies of the legislature.
The policy of the lawmakers in enacting tidelands legislation
should include a consideration of the reasonable expectations of the
littoral owner as well as the economics of any course of action.1 70
In the majority of situations where the land is either underdeveloped or being marginally utilized the public interest is best served
by reasonably restricting uses to the need of the region, even if this
appears to entail "condemning" the adjacent landowner's littoral
rights. There may be no greater need than for the public to have
their tidelands preserved from economic exploitation. 71 This is the
import of the California Constitutional provision upheld in Long
Beach.'72 The problems created by haphazard development, which
the commission was established to prevent, could not be controlled
solely by application of the Constitutional provisions or common
law "public trust" doctrines nor by a commission so hamstrung as
to be unable to control the source of the problem. It was necessary
for the legislature to recognize the public interest in vesting centralized control and adequate regulatory powers in BCDC to accomplish the requirements of comprehensive regional planning.
The Candlestick decision has another significant feature. Although the manner of judicial interpretation of the McAteer-Petris
made in the California tidelands, mostly to municipalities. 2ND CMC REP.
supra note 10, at 65.
170. Michelman supra note 158, at 1166-67.
171. During the period 1947-1967, seven percent nationally, and sixtyseven percent of California's estuarine areas had been destroyed by dredge
and fill operations. Hearings on Estuarine Areas before the Subcomm. on
Fisheries and Wildlife Conservation of the House Comm. on Merchant
Marine and Fisheries,90th Cong., 1st Sess., 37 (1967).
172. Text accompanying notes 55-59, supra.

Act is predictable when one analyzes the California law involved, 17 8
a court using the PennsylvaniaCoal Co. v. Mahon1 4 test of diminution of value, rather than the California approach of balancing of interests,1 7 5 could hold that the denial of a permit, even if pursuant to
a valid coastal zone plan, would be an unconstitutional taking unless Candlestick Properties were compensated. 7 6 By upholding the
commission's power to deny permits, the appellate court has assisted
the legislature in eliminating one of the prime problem areas
in coastal zone management-multiplicity of governmental entities
having control or responsibilities in the tidelands.1 7 7 The continued recognition of the public interest as contained in the statutes
and constitution will allow the legislature wide discretion to determine the manner in which these lands subject to the public trust
are to be allocated and utilized.
Zabel v. Tabb
It is now well established that the states have been delegated the
prime responsibility for ownership and management of the tidelands. 7 8 However, the federal government retains significant
residual powers of navigation, commerce, international relations and
national defense. It has been said that there are other national
priorities which also provide significant bases for the right of the
federal government to review the efficacy of any tidelands/coastal
zone management system imposed by a lesser entity.17 0 The power
of the federal government, if exercised, may well be plenary, however exclusive the states title to the tidelands may appear.' 80 Federal controls concerning the physical alteration of the tidelands
173. Text accompanying notes 75-77, supra.
174. 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
175. See note 85, supra.
176. See Michelman supra note 158, at 1190.
177. 2ND CMC REP. supra note 10, at 7; 2 Mmm LAw supra note 10,
at 352; see also, Power supra note 10, at 145.
178. An extended discussion of the evolution of ownership rights is not
appropriate here. There is a long line of cases from Pollard's Lessee v.
Hagan, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 211 (1845) through United States v. California, 332
U.S. 19 (1947) that have reaffirmed the proposition that the states "own" the
tidelands. See also, Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1 (1894).
179. These include:
a. preservation of unique natural areas;
b. tidelands as a national resource;
c. vital role of estuaries in supporting populations of migratory wildlife.

Panel Reports of the Comm. on Marine Science, Engineering and Resources,
H.R. Doc. No. 91-42, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 2 at 146 (1969).
180. Note 178, supra.
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have been exercised by the Secretary of the Army. 81 Generally
the government has exercised discretion in asserting its paramount
rights and has limited the scope of the Secretary's authority to
navigable waters, thereby excluding many estuaries and tidal
marshes, through the medium of the permit system established by
the Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899182 applying primarily to dredge
and fill operations. 83 Congress has reserved to the states the pri84
and has
mary authority for the administration of the tidelands,
consistently indicated an intention to continue to rely on the states
for the management of the coastal zone. 88 To date there has been
no national legislation concerning the management of the coastal
zone, although there have been continuing efforts to initiate such
legislation.' 8 6
There are two important enactments that affect the above
named powers of the Army Corps of Engineers to grant or deny
permits to alter the tidelands: the Fish and Wildlife Coordination
Act' 8 7 and the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969188 (NEPA). The significance of these laws was fully recognized by the
Zabel court. 8 9 Although not specifically directed at the coastal
zone, the court found that the intent of Congress was to grant all
governmental agencies not only the power, but the duty to consider
ecological factors before granting any permits that might affect the
environment.' 00
181. The first enactments having to do with the tidelands, vested in the
Department of War the right to prohibit erection of obstructions to navigation. Act of Sept. 19, 1890, ch. 907, § 7, 26 Stat. 454. The first act dealing
with the problems of refuse depositing in navigable waters was Act of Aug.
18, 1894, ch. 299, §§ 6-8, 28 Stat. 363, which involved only those navigable
waters that had been the subject of government appropriations and improvements. This was rectified in the Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899
(which included the Refuse Act), wherein the Secretary of War [later Army]
was given the power to permit the deposit of any material otherwise
proscribed by the Act, in "navigable waters, within limits to be defined
and under conditions to be prescribed by him," so long as in "the judgment
of the Chief of Engineers anchorage and navigation will not be injured
thereby." 33 U.S.C. § 407 (1970).
182. 33 U.S.C. § 403 et seq. (1970).
183. Heath supranote 64, at 355.
184. 43 U.S.C. § 1301 et seq. (1964).
185. Knight supra note 13, at 600 et seq.
186. Heath supra note 64, at 354.
187. 16 U.S.C. §§ 661-66 (1964).
188. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-47 (1970).
189. See text accompanying notes 115, et seq.
190. Zabel at 201; see also, Commv. ON GoV'T OPERATiONS, THE PsMn

Thus the Zabel court, as had the California courts previously discussed, acted to further the public interest in the tidelands. It may
even be postulated that this court was more impressed with the
overwhelming opposition to the granting of the permit 1 9' than it
was with the ultimate effects that its decision will have on coastal
zone management and control. That this decision prevented "a distinctly harmful effect on the fish and wildlife resources in Boca
Ciega Bay"'19 2 is laudable, but the ultimate effect on the Army Corps
of Engineer's District Engineers actual operational policies may
harm more than help the environment.
The proposition that Congress has delegated nearly "plenary"
powers to the Secretary of the Army, or his delegate, to consider
ecological factors in tidelands alteration situations before granting
or denying a permit, can be drawn from Zabel. By founding the
decision on the commerce power as delineated in Wickard v. Filburn,' 93 and ratifying the authority of the Secretary of the Army,
the court broadened the traditional scope of the Army's authority
in the tidelands far beyond that envisioned by the 1899 Act. 94 The
court's position is supported by both the cases and legislative intent.'-95 But one must also examine the circumstances in Zabel,
where a large number of citizens, a co-equal governmental agency,
and three state agencies, confronted the District Engineer and demanded that he deny the permit. In the face of this opposition,
Colonel Tabb had no alternative but to retreat and deny the permit. Contrast Zabel with the slightly different situation of the District Engineer, who when faced with a moderate number of concerned citizenry (13 against the permit, 5 for), an indecisive co-equal
governmental agency, and the tacit approval of the two state legislatures concerned (admittedly not in accordance with any plan)
grants the fill permit, even though the evidence before him showed
that ecological damage would result. 9 6 By affirming that the
Army has wide discretion in deciding whether to grant or deny the
permit, 97 and by extending this discretion to include the nebulous
concept of environment, the Zabel court through Congress has
vested too much power in the hands of the District Engineer. It is
FOR LANDFILL IN HuNTMIG CREEK:

A DEBACLE IN CONSERVATION,

4th REP., H.R.

REP. No. 91-113, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., 13 et. seq. (1969) [hereinafter cited
as HUNTING CREEK DEBACLE].

191.
192.
193.
194.

See text accompanying note 97, supra.
Zabel at 202.
317 U.S. 111 (1942).
See note 181, supra.
195. Note 113, supra; HuNTING CREEx DEBACLE supra note 190, at 9.
196. HUNTiNG CREEK DEBACLE supra note 190, at 13 et seq.
197. Zabel at 207.
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unrealistic to assume that any given District Engineer, lacking authoritative guidelines, resources upon which to base his evaluation,198 and particular expertise in the area of environmental protection, will be able to exercise that fine degree of discretion, value
judgment, and expertise which the states have found essential before even attempting to plan. 19 9 When one considers the additional
fact that the Army Corps of Engineers, acting under the guidance
of these same District Engineers, is one of the largest polluters of
the Great Lakes and northeastern rivers, the possibility for improvement becomes even more remote.20 0 That the District Engineer acts in good faith and to the best of his capabilities, is not to be
denied; it is simply that he is not the proper vehicle in the present
circumstances for implementing the management of the coastal
zone.
The crucial issue to arise from Zabel is not the wisdom or the
abilities of individual District Engineers but rather how much
power has been delegated to the Secretary of the Army to derogate
from a valid state comprehensive ocean area plan. 20 ' There are two
federal policy decisions involved. The first being that the Secretary
of the Army, having been delegated wide discretionary powers under the commerce clause, can deny or grant permits to alter the
coastline based on "ecological considerations", as well as the traditional considerations of navigation, flood control and the production of power. 20 2 The second being the avowed policy of Congress
to allow the states to fashion their own coastal zone management
programs, as evidenced by congressional action in other areas of environmental control.20 3 States like California (having recognized
198. Arguably the District Engineer can utilize the determinations made
by the Secretary of the Interior or his subordinates, plus public hearings,
but as demonstrated in the Hunting Creek debacle, these may be unavailable or inconclusive, HuNTiNG CREEK DEBACLE supra note 191, at 8-9, contrary to the dictates of the Fish and Wildlife Coordination Act, 16 U.S.C.
§§ 661, 662 (1964). For the conclusion of the Hunting Creek drama, see
Sax, A Little Sturm und Drang at Hunting Creek, ESQUIRE, Feb., 1971, at 84.
199. The BCDC recently completed their regional plan after a four
year study costing over $1,000,000 from an area roughly the same size as
that administered by a District Engineer. Heath supra note 64, at 356.
200. Hearings on H.R. 4148 and Related Bills before House Comm. on
PublicWorks, 91st Cong., lst Sess., at 117 et seq. (1969).
201. Note 134, supra.
202 Zabel at 200.
203. See Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1151 et seq.
(1970).

the problem, having few interstate jurisdictional conflicts, and
having commenced to resolve the problem) need little federal guidance or control in order to implement an effective and comprehensive coastal zone management plan. Yet the very commerce powers
delegated by Congress and recognized in Zabel, could be used to
over-ride and thwart such a plan once enacted by the state legislature.
The potential conflict would likely arise in the situation where
an applicant would file for permission to fill a tideland area with
the District Engineer. The Engineer, after an independent apprisal
and evaluation of the impact of this project on the environment,
would grant the permit.20 4 The applicant would then attempt to
compel the state to grant their equivalent permit, even if to grant
such a permit would be in direct contravention of a comprehensive
coastal zone plan for the area of concern. The grounds for such a
mandate would be that the managing state agency could not deny
permission to fill the land once the District Engineer, under his delegated commerce clause powers, had granted the permit, since any
action taken by the state denying that authority would be an illegal
usurption of the commerce power. The fact that there are two conflicting congressional policies, and that there is no federal legislation concerning the specific problem of coastal zone management,
may lead the court to uphold the Army's permit and preclude the
state from denying their permit. The court could rely on Zabel for
the proposition that since Congress has delegated its powers to the
Army, and those powers are plenary, the state can do nothing to
invalidate the previously granted permit.20 5 Such a position would
emasculate any state coastal zone plan, and would have the ultimate
effect of casting the entire costal zone management burden into the
hands of the federal government.
CONCLUSION

It is in the ultimate public interest to have the tidelands so administered as to maximize the beneficial uses and minimize those
uses that derogate the quality of the coastal zone. To this end, each
of these courts has attempted to resolve existing conflicts, by the
use of statutes, constitutional provisions and the common law.
With an ear attuned to the legislative policy to preserve our environment for the future needs of society, these courts have at204. See HUNTING CREE=

DEBACLE supranote 190, at 9.
205. Id., at 64; see also, Sax, A Little Sturm und Drang at Hunting
Creek, ESQUIR,

Feb., 1971, at 124, col. 2.
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tempted to best serve the public welfare. Having been required to
work with archaic tools, these three courts have shown that it is
possible for the judicial system to keep abreast of society's needs.
But the scope of the problem of managing the coastal zone, in a
manner consonant with technology and future needs, is far broader
than the case by case approach of the judicial system. The courts
can only function with the law as it is written and interpreted.
The solution is for lawmakers to recognize the primary interest of
the state in its own tidelands, and to the extent that the states are
unwilling or unable to manage their own tidelands, recognize the
over-riding responsibility of the federal government for the national environment. Then Congress, using an approach similar to
that of the Water Quality Control Act of 1965, should formulate national standards, establish timetables for meeting those standards,
provide financial and technical assistance to the states, and implement adeqate enforcement procedures. This would allow the state
to seek independent and, in some cases, more severe solutions better attuned to local needs for their own coastal zone management
problems, at the same time insuring that there were some efforts
being made by all tidelands states to preserve the public trust for
their citizens, as handed down to them by the common law.
We need action by the Legislature20 6next year. We have everything to gain and a coastline to lose.

TOM J. BARRAcK
Vnan nA SH=E
RAY OND T. THEp
LOPEN E. WEISS

206. Editorial, Los Angeles Times, Dec. 10, 1970, Part II at 6, col. 2.

